INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF NATIONAL CONSUMER PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR OF THE EU-27: A COMPOSITE INDEX AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Abstract

Introduction. The article foregrounds the problem of the institutional capacity of national consumer protection systems in the energy sector under conditions of decarbonisation, digitalisation, and increasing household social vulnerability across the EU-27. It argues that the formal entrenchment of consumer rights in EU law does not, in itself, ensure their effective implementation if national institutions fail to provide accessible procedures, timely complaint handling, enforceability of decisions, linkage to supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, and adequate protection for vulnerable consumers. Against this background, the national consumer protection system in the electricity sector is conceptualised as a multi-level institutional configuration combining energy regulators, alternative dispute resolution bodies, ombudsman schemes, general consumer protection authorities, and social institutions.

Purpose. The study aims to construct and operationalise a composite index of the institutional capacity of national consumer protection systems in the energy sector and to apply this index to the comparative measurement and interpretation of cross-country variation within the EU-27. In addition, it seeks to distinguish between de jure and de facto dimensions, identify institutional configurations associated with higher capacity scores, and demonstrate the analytical value of the proposed instrument for the reform of public administration systems.

Materials and Methods. The study is conducted within a comparative institutional design in which the unit of analysis is the EU-27 country in the retail electricity sector. The empirical basis consists of a standardised dataset covering 27 countries, 26 indicators, and 702 “country × indicator” observations. The evidence base was compiled from legislation, regulatory procedures, ADR rules and ombudsman schemes, annual reports, and documented examples of practical implementation. Coding was carried out according to a unified protocol with a clear distinction between de jure and de facto components. Institutional capacity was operationalised across five dimensions: Architecture, Redress, Enforcement, Collective & Vulnerable, and Governance. To ensure comparability, the study employed min-max normalisation, weighted aggregation, and robustness checks of rankings through alternative weighting schemes and Spearman rank correlations.

Results. The findings show that the mean value of the effective version of the index for the EU-27 is 0.803; however, the distribution of scores reveals a clear stratification into leading, middle, and lower-performing groups. The highest-ranking systems are those in which consumer redress mechanisms are functionally integrated with supervisory and enforcement structures and supported by stronger governance capacity. The analysis demonstrates that the principal predictors of high institutional capacity are not merely the overall regulatory density of the system, but rather the configuration of the Redress, Enforcement, and Governance dimensions. It is further shown that there is no single “ideal” institutional architecture: high performance can be achieved through different institutional pathways, provided that their elements are functionally integrated. The study also establishes that higher index values are systematically associated with a more extensive documented record of the practical functioning of protection mechanisms, that is, with greater de facto coverage. These results confirm the analytical significance of distinguishing between the formal recognition of rights and the actual capacity of institutions to transform an individual complaint into an enforceable outcome.

Prospects. The proposed composite index can serve as an instrument for comparative monitoring, evaluation of the quality of national consumer protection models, identification of reform priorities, and strengthening of public governance in the energy sector. The practical value of the study lies in the possibility of adapting this framework to Ukraine in order to compare its institutional arrangements with EU-27 practices, support European integration reforms, and design institutionally robust mechanisms for the protection of vulnerable consumers. Future research should apply the proposed framework to other energy and network sectors, use longitudinal data to trace the dynamics of reform, and combine the index-based approach with qualitative analysis of institutional configurations and causal relationships among the elements of the protection system.